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On the basis of unique longitudinal data from India, we develop and Lest in this paper a framework capable of explaining marriage cum migration patterns. Our central hypothesis is that marital arrangements among households, in particular, the "exchange" of individuals among households, characterized by the distance between households and assortative mating patterns, are manifestations of implicit contractual arrangements serving to mitigate income risk and facilitate consumption smoothing under conditions in which there are informational costs and spatially covariant risks.3 Problems of information asymmetries and returns to risk diversification have previously been fruitfully incorporated in models of such formal rural institutions as banks and sharecropping contracts and of the landholding arrangements of cultivating households (e.g., McCloskey 1976). While only recently have insurance considerations been brought to bear to the study of actual migration phenomena (Lucas and Stark 1985) , the pervasiveness of risk and its important spatial character in rural agricultural societies suggest that attention to consumption smoothing arrangements and insurance mechanisms may be useful in understanding marriage migration processes.
Anthropological and econometric studies indicate that interhousehold family transfers are an important source of income insurance in low-income countries. Indeed, there is evidence (Caldwell, Reddy, and Caldwell 1986; Rosenzweig 1988a ) that nonresident inlaws in India are the principal source of income transfers for households experiencing income shortfalls associated with the exigencies of weather.4 The MFLS data suggest similar patterns in Malaysia: 39 percent of the value of all goods and cash transfers for purposes of "emergency" help and for "maintaining expenditures" and sent at least 20 miles from the sample Malaysian households went to the inmarriage, only 27.5 percent of all their moves were for marriage. Among males of Indian ethnic origin, 13.7 percent migrated when married and 5.6 percent of all their moves were for marriage. The "Indian" pattern of marriage migration appears to depend more on the environment than on ethnicity per se. 3 We do not investigate the role of dowry payments in marital arrangements. Such payments are part of the set of intergenerational relationships, along with inheritances, whose study we are pursuing in other work. 4 Caldwell et al. (1986) found in their study of nine villages in Karnataka in South India that 56 percent of the relatives providing aid during droughts were either relatives of the head's wife or those of the husbands of the head's daughters. None of these relatives were located within the study villages. Using a subset of the data described below, Rosenzweig (1988a) found that almost 60 percent of income transfers (in value terms), representing 10 percent of agricultural profits on average, originated outside the village, that such transfers moved inversely with agricultural profits, and that the inverse association between net transfers (exclusive of marriage-related gifts and dowries) and profits was stronger among households with greater numbers of resident daughters-in-law. laws of the male head of the household (22 percent to his parents).5 Eighty-four percent of the value of the longer-distance transfers received by the sample households was sent by the children of the head, but the MFLS does not identify the sex of these donors.
In Section I, we briefly describe our framework for examining the locational and sorting patterns of marriages under a regime of spatially covariant risks and compare the implications of the framework with those derived from models of marriage and migration that ignore payoffs to risk diversification. Section II provides a description of the sample used and its statistics on spatial correlations in rainfall and incomes, mobility, marital arrangements, and the extent of occupational, locational, and marital diversification characterizing Indian farm households. In Section III, an econometric analysis is performed to test directly the proposition that marital arrangements contribute to mitigating the influence of farm income variability on household consumption. Section IV tests the implications for how household wealth holdings and the degree of risk characterizing crop production jointly influence the average quality of marital matches and the mobility-via marriage and via migration-and occupational choices of household members. The results support the hypothesized consumption smoothing role of marital arrangements and indicate, consistent with the insurance-theoretic framework, that the exogenous income riskiness faced by a household and its ability to selfinsure via its own wealth holdings jointly and in a similar way influence (i) the distance between it and the households with which it is engaged in marital cum insurance contracts and (ii) the probability that the household has among its members temporary migrants or resident persons with nonvolatile incomes. The wealth-contractdistance relationships estimated appear to be inconsistent, however, with models of marriage (or migration) concerned only with costs of search and static income gains.
I. Spatial Risk Patterns and the Gains from Marriage Migration
A distinguishing feature of the agricultural sector is that income risk has a strong spatial dimension. As a consequence, the pooling of risks entails the transfer of funds or resources across space. The spatial separation (distance) of agents who might benefit from a risk-pooling arrangement, however, makes such arrangements difficult, given the 5Seventy-nine (36) percent of the value of household transfer inflows (outflows) of cash and goods for emergency support and consumption maintenance traversed distances of 20 or more miles. Because of small cell sizes, it is not possible to distinguish precisely differences in the patterns of these transfers among Malaysian ethnic groups. need to monitor performance as a consequence of moral hazard. Thus while the distance between contracting agents provides a riskpooling benefit, it also increases costs of enforcement. The nonexistence of competitively provided crop insurance and the difficulties of credit provision in most low-income rural areas are in part consequences of' the spatial character of' agricultural risks. Protection against risks, however, is an important need of households engaged in agricultural production.
One means by which a household may spatially diversify its sources of income, using the bonds of' kinship to mitigate the consequences of' enforcement costs, is to locate its members in areas characterized by low covariances in income. The transfer of a family member to another established household confers diversification benefits to both households with minimal setup costs, which may be high in settings in which there are important area-specific experiential returns.'i The presence in household i of a member of' householdj not only supplies household j with an incentive to contribute to consumption smoothing in i (altruism) but also introduces a verification and monitoring capacity.
Marriage across villages, whereby one of the marital partners "migrates" to the household of the other partner, thus in part fulfills the role of an institution providing income insurance benefits for households in the presence of spatially covariant risks. Note that this form of migration is welfare-improving even in the absence of' any (expected) intervillage wage differentials and even if village-specific risk distributions are identical, as long as the timing of states of nature is not perfectly synchronized. Indeed, in that case migration by entire households would never occur.
If' households connected by marriage are also related because of some past marriages, an additional layer of enforcement is enjoyed. Moreover, if kinship facilitates information flows, marital matches among partners already related by kinship will be desirable. Thus risk considerations suggest that marriages will take place between partners in different rather than the same villages, but not in order to avoid marriages between close kin. Rather, marriages are likely to be among kin groups because they take place across spatially separated locations.
Considerations of the returns to risk via cross-household sharing arrangements and problems of incentives imply a particular assortative mating pattern: the origin and destination households' "perma-nent" characteristics or endowments influencing the level and variability in incomes will be similar (positive assortative mating with respect to the persistent attributes of agricultural incomes), but the correlation between income outcomes will be as low as possible. Close matching by endowments is desirable because a difference in endowments that determines susceptibility to risk (such as the size of irrigated landholdings) leaves the better-endowed household poorly insured.
Information considerations would appear to suggest that marriages arranged by a household with many daughters, for example, would often take place with multiple sons from another household, particularly given the desirability of matching households. While multiple transactions with the same household do minimize transaction costs, gains from diversification are not fully exploited. The insuranceconscientious village household will best subdivide its risk by sharing it among different villages.
The risk-theoretic approach to marriage migration thus implies that (a) households engaged in a marriage exchange will be closely matched by the permanent traits of the members; (b) gains in income levels associated with marriage migration moves will be small or nonexistent; (c) individuals from the same origin household will tend not to have the same destinations; (d) households with more wealth, and thus better able to self-insure, will invest less in marriage migration; the distance between households linked by marriage will be less for the wealthier, to the extent that distance confers a diversification benefit; and (e) households facing greater income risk, for given wealth levels, will be more willing to finance moves of longer distance. 7 Risk-theoretic considerations provide predictions about marital arrangements and migration that diverge in some important respects from those of standard migration and marriage models. Economic models of marriage (Becker 1973 (Becker , 1974 Keeley 1977 ) and of migration incorporate income gain and search cost considerations, with Cooper (1987) demonstrates that in a model in which agricultural income is uncertain, nondecreasing relative risk aversion with a value less than or equal to one or nonincreasing absolute risk aversion is a sufficient condition for a mean-preserving increase in risk to increase a household's demand for insurance via the allocation of additional household time (migration) to riskless activities. In Quizon, Binswanger, and Machina (1984) it is shown that the experimental evidence on risk aversion (Binswanger 1981) based on lottery games played with residents of the Indian villages from which our survey data were obtained (see below) is consistent with increasing relative risk aversion. The experimental evidence suggests a high degree of' risk aversion for games involving large payoffs (500 rupees) and is consistent as well with prospect theory risk models. The evidence appears to reject, however, standard economic models of' risk behavior incorporating linear probability weights on von NeumannMorgenstern utilities of final wealth levels. marriage models, unlike those of migration, concerned as well with the matching of individuals' traits, although this is implicit in migration models in which individuals seek locations most complementary to their skills.
Positive assortative mating is predicted by income gain marriage models on the basis of the notion that individuals' traits are for the most part complementary. While this implication is the same for the risk diversification framework, the existence of income gains from closely matching traits implies that those individuals with relatively rare traits will invest more in search. In a spatial context, therefore, using the income gain framework, we would expect that the wealthier would tend to search over a greater area for a marital match and to be engaged, on average, in longer-distance marital arrangements. In contrast, the risk model implies that the primary payoff to distance is the reduction in risk covariances, which is less valued by the wealthy who are better able to self-insure. The wealth-distance relationship provides a strong test of the two approaches to marriage in the Indian setting.
A well-known finding of migration studies is the high serial correlation in migration flows between specific origins and destinations. This finding is often attributed in the migration literature to the role of information (Greenwood 1971 ). As noted, such search-theoretic considerations thus suggest that the correlation between the destinations of individuals from the same origin (household) will be positive, while risk diversification suggests the desirability of diversity among destinations. The sign of the correlation between the destinations of marital migrants thus discriminates between the risk and income gain approaches to migration. Risk-diversifying behavior is indicated if households distribute their migrant members across destinations with differing mean incomes rather than concentrating them at the higher mean income destination. Finally, in contrast to the income gain models applied to marriage migration, the risk framework suggests that (origin) income riskiness will increase the distances of marriagemigration linkages. Table 1 provides the regression estimates of the effects of distance on the z-values of the 10-year correlations for daily rainfall (in the critical agricultural months of July-October), real mean profits net of the value of family labor, and real agricultural (male) wage rates based on the six-village ICRISAT sample. The results indicate that distance decreases significantly the correlations in all three variables: the point estimates suggest that for each 1 00-kilometer increase in the distance between locations, the correlations in rainfall, profits, and wages decline by .073 (18 percent), .083 (49 percent), and .038 (7 percent), respectively.9
B. Mobility and Marriage
In the analysis of marriage and migration, we shall use data principally on farm households in the three villages (Aurepalle, Shirapur, and Kanzara) for which there is both continuous information over the 10 years on farm profits and food expenditures and the supplemental marital information. Each village represents a distinct agroclimatic area. Aurepalle is located in a region marked by low levels of erratically distributed rainfall and by soils with limited water storage capac-9 The sample of six ICRISAT villages provides estimates that may overstate the extent to which distance generally reduces the covariation in agricultural incomes since sample site selection was based in part on the criterion of minimizing the similarity in agroclimatic conditions across regions. Thus the pairs of villages within each of three regions are likely to experience similar conditions and are proximate (the intraregion mean distance is 22 kilometers), while the mean cross-region distance between villages, for which conditions are dissimilar, is 583 kilometers. ity. Shirapur is characterized by soils with somewhat better storage capacities but is in an area with equally irregular and low levels of rainfall and little irrigation. Kanzara is also characterized by low levels of rainfall, but rainfall is somewhat more reliable and soils have storage capacities equal to that of Shirapur. The principal crops grown in the villages are sorghum, pigeon peas, pearl millet, chick-peas, and groundnuts-crops unaffected by the Indian "Green Revolution." Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the farm (cultivating) households in the sample.'0 Agricultural incomes are quite variable: the 10-year standard deviation in farm profits net of the value of family labor is 25 percent greater than mean profits for the average farm household.
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
The three villages appear to conform to the general Indian mobility pattern. Only eight of 108 (male) heads of households inclusive of nonfarm households (less than 7 percent) were born outside the village, while almost 94 percent of married women were not residents of the village prior to marriage. " 1 "Temporary" migration is more preva-10 Included in the sample are all cultivating households in the three villages that remained in the survey over the 10-year period from 1975/76 to 1984/85, when the retrospective questionnaires were applied. Of the 90 original farm households in 1975/ 76, 70 were present in 1984/85, but seven of these were not able to be interviewed for purposes of obtaining information on the distances of marriages. Unfortunately, households were dropped from the sample when there was a change in the head of the household. In almost all cases this was due to the death of the head. l l A supplementary retrospective survey on the kinship relations associated with all marriages in the sample households in one of the villages, Shirapur, indicates that 915 lent than male "permanent" migration but less pervasive than marital migration in the sample. Only 28 percent of the sample farm households reported having at least one migrant member, a person 18 years of age or over not resident in the village household nor residing in an independent household. While all these household members were located outside of the sample villages and only two of the 57 migrants worked in agriculture, less than half of the migrants represented a potential steady source of income since 40 percent were attending school. Migrants with regular salaries or with incomes not highly covariant with those of the sample households are still more prevalent than resident household members holding salaried jobs, who are found in only 10 percent of the farm households.
With respect to spatial diversification via marriage, the mean distance from a sample household to the origin villages of the daughtersin-law is 30 kilometers. Most important, within all but two of the 49 percent of households with two or more married women, each married woman came from a different village. The mean of the maximum distances between the origin villages of the married women within these households, inclusive of any women born in the same village, is 47.7 kilometers. The observed within-household diversification of marriage partners by origin location appears to be inconsistent with pure search-theoretic income gain theories of migration or marriage. 12 To assess the degree to which there is positive assortative mating with respect to the mean income-generating characteristics of the parents of the marital partners, we performed a confirmatory factor analysis (Joreskog 1969 ) based on the survey information describing the family backgrounds of the heads and their wives in the 10 ICRISAT villages. We assumed that the permanent income potential or "quality" of each partner's origin household, a latent variable, is despite geographical exogamy, or more precisely because of it, almost all marital partners were also related by kinship. Of the 115 marriages, only 14 (12.2 percent) involved partners who were not also relatives. Daughters-in-law of the head, for example, were most typically daughters of a sibling of either the head's father or the father of the head's wife. The ties between spatially separated households thus are typically reinforced by marriages, not just initiated by them.
12 A farm household may diversify its income sources and thus reduce the intertemporal variability in its income by cultivating plots of land differentiated by their sensitivities to given states of nature in addition to diversifying the geographical location of potential income sources in the face of spatially covariant income risks. However, while almost three-fourths of farm households in the three villages own two or more plots of land, less than half own plots that are distinct from each other in terms of either soil quality (among seven types), irrigation, or location. Moreover, the households do not appear to view plot fragmentation as advantageous: of the plots purchased by the households in the three villages since inheritance, 42 percent were acquired in order to consolidate landholdings or because the plot was close to the household's residence. Diversification was never mentioned as a reason for either buying or selling plots. 
III. Household Characteristics and Consumption Smoothing
The close matching of marital partners with respect to origin household variables and the diversity and distance characterizing the ICRISAT households' marriage portfolios are consistent with the hypothesis that marital arrangements influence a household's ability to smooth its consumption when confronted with highly variable income streams. In this section we exploit the longitudinal feature of the ICRISAT data to estimate directly the contribution of marriage migration, as well as of endowed wealth, to consumption smoothing. Consider a household that in each year t produces a stochastically determined amount of income from own crop production t. Consumption ct-for household i in year t is then
where Tti (other income) represents other sources of the household's net income, from the sale or purchase of assets, from increasing or decreasing debt, and from interhousehold and possibly intrafamily net transfers. 
where wt-is household wealth at time t, ft-is household expected future crop income at time t, -Utk is the crop income at time t of the kth potential transfer partner, and a and the Yk measure the extent to which own wealth and transfer households, respectively, contribute to smoothing income, where (x < 0, (x' 0, and Yk C 0. Note that because v captures what is conventionally defined as "savings," that is, the change in net wealth, as well as net transfer income, both of which contribute to smoothing income, expression (3) is not the standard income-consumption-saving relationship in a regime of imperfect capital markets. If households have an infinite horizon and the stochastic income process is characterized by stationarity, assumptions not unreasonable for the environment we are studying, we can treat Ptit as a constant for a given household i; that is, any current realization of crop income will not affect income expectations. Changes in consumption for a household i, given (2) Two extreme views of low-income country environments are nested in (4). If there are perfect credit markets or all households are able to self-insure perfectly, then aL = -1 and Yk = 0; for each household, consumption will be constant (given stationarity and an infinite horizon), independent of stochastic realizations of income. If, on the other hand, no household can "store" income and there are no riskpooling arrangements via credit markets or via implicit familial contracts, then a = 0 and Yk = 0; current consumption is then dependent solely on current crop income. We believe that neither of these extreme cases well characterizes the Indian setting; instead we expect that -1 < a < 0 and Yk < 0, that a household's ability to smooth consumption depends on its owned asset stock, a(' < 0, and on its ability to engage in risk pooling with partners with low covariant incomes.
We can use the ICRISAT data to estimate a variant of (4). On the basis of the 10-year time series, we computed intertemporal variances for both farm profits (net of the value of family labor) and food expenditures (85 percent of all expenditures) for each farm household, in 1983 rupees.i3 For the household's wealth stock, we used the value of the household head's inheritance, again in 1983 rupees, which we assume to be exogenous to the household's consumption smoothing preferences. The most difficult component to measure in equation (4) is the covariation in incomes between the (potential) transfer partners and the farm household. To obtain such information would require a survey that followed over time all households or individuals potentially engaged in risk pooling/income sharing, not just the sampled (representative) households. We know of no such survey. However, the incomes of household migrants, almost none of whom are engaged in agricultural production, are unlikely to be correlated with the sample household's farm profits. With respect to the origin households of the resident married women, we can use the information collected on the distance to these households, based on the findings in table 1 that distance is negatively related to the covariation in agricultural incomes. We thus can test whether there is a payoff to increasing the distance between the households of marital partners in terms of the enhanced ability of the household to smooth consumption via income sharing.
Let durid'9rk = 6dik, where dik is the distance between household i and "partner" household k and 8 < 0 (from table 1). Then the basic equation we estimate is oQ?(c) = P3o + Pciu(1r) + I32Io(r() + P33Wicru('T) + 4MrU(1T) + P5Du?(1T) + Ei, 13 We use food expenditures rather than total expenditures because of the wellknown difficulties of correcting for the lumpiness of consumer durable expenditures. Food expenditures include the value of consumption from own production and from own food stocks. where oKi(c) and crir) are the 10-year food expenditure and profit variances, respectively, I is inherited wealth, W is the number of resident married women, M is the number of household migrants, D is the mean distance between the sample household i and the origin households of the resident married women, E-is the householdspecific error term, and 5 = -Yk6. Perfect intertemporal markets would imply all Pk = 0; alternatively, the absence of any mechanisms to transfer income either over time or contemporaneously across households implies that PI is close to 0.8, the proportion of food in total expenditures, and P3I = 0, 1 = 2, . . ., 5. With self-insurance and with spatial risk pooling associated with migrants and marriages, i < 0,1= 3,...,5. Table 4 reports estimates obtained from three specifications of equation (5), all of which additionally include village dummy variables.'4 In the first column, we exclude the possibility of spatial income pooling. The results reject the hypotheses that households, independent of their endowed wealth, can perfectly smooth consumption or that households cannot smooth consumption at all via asset transactions. The joint hypotheses (i) that both the profit variance and inherited wealth profit variance interaction coefficients equal zero (F(2, 57) = 4.7) and (ii) that the profit variance coefficient equals 0.85 while the wealth interaction coefficient equals zero (F(2, 47) = 5.3) are rejected at the .0001 level of significance. Indeed, inherited wealth significantly contributes to consumption smoothing. A one-standard-deviation increase in wealth, at the sample means, reduces the impact of profit variance in food consumption by 12 percent. 15 In the second column of table 4 we add the migration and marriage profit variance interaction variables. These results indicate that both the number of married women and the distance between the origin households of the marital partners contribute significantly (statistically) to reducing the variability in household food consumption, for given variability in farm profits. The presence of household "temporary" migrants also reduces the impact of profit variability, but only marginally. The point estimates indicate that at the sample means the (positive) effect of profit variability on the variability in food expenditures is reduced by 15 percent when the number of resident married women increases by 1 and by 6 percent for each one-standarddeviation (60 kilometers) increase in the mean distance between the farm household and the origin households of the resident married women. The addition of a household migrant has a weaker effect, reducing the effect of profit variance by 3 percent. In the last column of table 4, we assess the robustness of our results to the addition of variables representing the number of resident adult male and female market (off-farm) workers. The presence of such workers may reduce the effects of profit variability on the variability in household consumption, to the extent that off-farm labor supply responds flexibly to own farm profits and off-farm earnings opportunities in the village are not perfectly correlated with own farm profits. The estimates indicate that the null hypothesis that the number of off-farm workers does not reduce consumption variability among farm households cannot be rejected (F(2, 53) = 0.91). Moreover, the influence of marriage migration in reducing the impact of profit variability on consumption variability is essentially unchanged when the family worker variables are included. It is not the presence of adult women (or men) in the household willing or able to work but their marital status, with 15 We also included in eq. (5) inherited wealth not interacted with the profit variance to assess if the variances in consumption are greater among the wealthier for given variability in incomes. The coefficient on this variable was not statistically significant in any specification (t-ratios were 0.14, 0.13, and 0.06 in the three variants of [5]), and its inclusion altered only trivially the coefficients and t-ratios reported in table 4. its associated interhousehold bonds, that contributes to income risk mitigation.
IV. The Determinants of Spatial Income Diversification
The preceding results suggest that the distance between the origin locations of marital partners contributes to the mitigation of consumption variability, as does the household's asset holdings and, marginally, household migrants. In this section we test the hypothesis that farm households facing exogenously riskier incomes associated with spatially covariant risks will be more likely to invest in spatial risk diversification. We also examine the influence of endowed wealth on such arrangements. A difficulty in relating variability in incomes to household arrangements is that income volatility can in part be influenced by household resource allocations. Even fluctuations in farm profits, net of family labor costs and thus net of family labor supply decisions, can be modified by households, for example, via crop or plot diversification strategies or investments in water control mechanisms. Both farm profit variability and arrangements facilitating ex post income transfers may thus reflect a household's attitudes toward risk. The covariation between profit variance and ex post insurance arrangements does not necessarily provide, therefore, evidence on the appropriate experiment, which would alter exogenously the riskiness of incomes for a given household, when households are heterogeneous in risk preferences.
As noted, the ICRISAT data provide information on daily rainfall for the 10-year period. We constructed monthly rainfall variances for each of the critical agricultural months (July-October) for each of the villages. We used as instruments these weather variables interacted with each household's inherited dry and wet landholdings to predict each household's mean and variance in profits for the 10 years. Under the assumption that village rainfall and inheritances do not reflect household risk preferences, these predicted measures of household income risk should be orthogonal to preferences.I 6 To test the influence of wealth on marriage migration, we used the value of the head's inheritance, again because a household's postinheritance wealth state will reflect in part its desire for self-insurance and thus its attitudes toward risk, while the head's inheritance is less likely to be correlated with preferences. We expect, as noted, that It The estimates front the first-stage regressions are available froml the authors on request.
households with more variable profits, for given mean profits, and households with less endowed wealth, ceteris paribus, will be more likely to invest in temporary migration, to have some of their members participate as regular salaried workers, and to invest in marriages with partners whose origin households are separated by greater distances. Riskiness in incomes raises the return to such investments, while wealth is a substitute for such income insurance mechanisms, as evident in table 4. Moreover, while higher wealth and profits in the head's (parents') household should attract a spouse from a higherwealth household, greater variability in incomes is a liability and should lower the mean value of the match, ceteris paribus. Table 5 reports estimates of the effects of profit variability and endowed wealth on the number of migrants, on the presence or absence in the household of a worker with a regular salaried job (assured yearly income), and on the mean distance between the origin village of the resident daughters-in-law and the sample household, on the basis of two-stage tobit, two-stage probit, and two-stage leastsquares procedures, respectively.'7 We also assess whether the inheritance of the head's father and profit variability influence the value of the landholdings of the father-in-law of the head. The estimating procedures take into account both the possible endogeneity of the profit variables and the specific properties of the dependent variable; that is, no households had more than one salaried worker or a member who was a farm servant, and 76 percent of the households had no temporary migrant. In all cases, we could reject the hypothesis that the variance in profits is orthogonal to the error terms. Heterogeneity in risk preferences does appear to jointly influence both realized profit variability and ex post income insurance arrangements.
Two specifications are reported for each dependent variable, one with and one without (predicted) mean profits for the household. The results appear to support the view that exogenously imposed income variability induces households to alter the sources of their incomes. In particular, among farm households with equal endowments of wealth, those afflicted with more variable profits from cultivation are more likely to initiate arrangements conducive to income risk pooling that encompass greater distances, via both "temporary" migrants and longer-distance migration associated with marriage. Moreover, greater (predicted) variability in incomes reduces the mean value of the marital match that the household was able to obtain, consistent with risk-avoidance behavior in the marriage market.
The negative wealth coefficients in the distance regression also con-17 The two-stage maximum likelihood tobit and probit procedures are described in Smith and Blundell (1986). form to the risk insurance model of marriage cum migration but are inconsistent with the conventional theory of marriage, in which families with greater wealth are predicted to search for marital partners over a larger area. Although high-wealth households are evidently more likely to contract marriages with other high-wealth households, in conformity to the assortative mating prediction, farm families with greater wealth, among those households facing the same income risk, are less likely to be characterized by marriages extending over long distances, despite their enhanced ability to finance a search over a wider area and their greater difficulty in finding a desirable marital match. 18 As is consistent with the results in table 4, the usefulness of asset holdings for reducing consumption volatility, for given income variability, appears to be reflected in households' decisions about migration and marriage cum migration arrangements. Wealth is thus not merely a matching trait or a source of investment funds, and marriage and migration are not merely mechanisms for increasing income levels.
V. Conclusion
In this paper we have examined from a risk-theoretic perspective a major component of migration in low-income rural areas, that associated with the movement of women for the purpose of marriage. In particular, we have hypothesized that the spatial distribution and characteristics of matches associated with the marriage of daughters are in part manifestations of implicit interhousehold contractual arrangements facilitating consumption smoothing in an environment characterized by information costs and spatially covariant risks. Analysis of longitudinal data from villages in South India provided support for the hypothesis, indicating that marriage cum migration contributes to a reduction in the variability in consumption, for given variability in income from crop production, and that households exposed to higher income risk are more likely to invest in longerdistance migration-marriage arrangements. The hypothesized and observed patterns of migration and marriage do not appear consistent with standard models of marriage or migration that are concerned solely with search costs and differentials in expected income levels. These patterns thus suggest that spatial differences in the average returns to skills (or wage levels) may not importantly account for population movements within rural India. 18 The location of the wealthy households is not the reason for this result. While there is a tendency for wealthier households to cluster among themselves within villages, the sample villages are not situated in "wealthy" areas, i.e., in closer proximity to villages with higher proportions of wealthy households. However, our framework also implies that agricultural technical change may significantly alter spatial marriage patterns, if not the stability of the marriage institution, since such change not only alters the spatial covariances and levels of risk but renders more difficult the assessment of risk and, thus, the establishment of implicit risk arrangements. Conversely, improvements in formal institutional arrangements (e.g., credit markets) that facilitate consumption smoothing may reduce the role played by risk considerations in marital arrangements and rural migration, perhaps resulting in diminished rural mobility. Finally, our results suggest that the value to parents of having a girl relative to having a boy in environments characterized by underdeveloped insurance markets and spatially covariant risks may be substantially understated by sex differentials in expected labor market returns. Attention to the returns arising from the specialized role of daughters accruing from their dispersion, moreover, suggests that policies lowering ex ante income risks in such settings may result in diminished resources allocated to young girls if intrahousehold resource allocations are influenced by economic incentives.
